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Border security is of great importance to most countries. Turkey has been in 
conflict with terrorist groups since the 1980s. Up to now, more than 40,000 
people have been killed, including Turkish soldiers and civilians. The porosity 
and openness of Turkey’s Iraq border, combined with the rugged topography of 
the region, creates a passage for terrorist groups to move materiel and 
personnel. Technical capabilities of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UAVs can be 
used to improve coverage along borders. However, their effectiveness is highly 
dependent on the characteristics of the region. In this study, 87 km of the Turkey-
Iraq border is modeled in Map Aware Non Uniform Automata (MANA) to examine 
the potential impact of UAVs on detecting and classifying terrorists seeking 
passage from Northern Iraq into Turkey. The results from the 103,200 simulated 
terrorist incursions are analyzed using descriptive statistics, stepwise linear 
regression, lasso regression, regression trees, and random forests. The use of 
UAVs is found to be efficient in the detection and classification of terrorists in this 
region. The analysis techniques reveal that the most significant factors are the 
UAV’s detection and classification performance, as well as the terrorists’ counter 
detection capabilities. Thus, Turkey (and countries trying to secure similar 
terrain) should purchase (or build) and employ hard-to-detect UAVs with 
sophisticated sensors. 
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Border security is of great importance to most countries. Many countries spend a 
significant portion of their budget protecting their border against terrorists, 
smugglers, and illegal immigrants. Illegal activities cause direct effects, especially 
for the regions adjacent to borders, and indirect effects for the entire country. 
Turkey has been in conflict with terrorist groups since the 1980s. Up to now, 
more than 40,000 people have been killed, including Turkish soldiers and 
civilians. Terrorist activities have also ruined the socioeconomic and social 
stability of the region.  
The preeminent terrorist threat coming from Turkey’s borders is the 
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is an armed Kurdish organization 
struggling with Turkey. The organization is also listed as a foreign terrorist 
organization by the U.S Department of Defense (DoD). The southeast (SE) 
border of Turkey contains the majority of terrorist activities. The region is known 
for its steep mountains and deep dales. Thus, the soldiers protecting the border 
have limited lines-of-sight (LOS). These conditions reduce the probability of 
detecting PKK militants operating or transiting in the region. 
The PKK terrorist organization also takes advantage of the gaps along the 
border in its illegal drug trafficking, which supports the organization financially. 
Terrorists use ever changing guerilla tactics. They cross over the border to attack 
military outposts and to bring explosives for use in bomb attacks in urban areas. 
Simultaneous raids are a recently used tactic of the terrorist organization. In 
addition to military stations, the terrorists attack military and police lodgings, 
prefectures, and government agencies. 
In Turkey, conventional Turkish military and police forces play a key role in 
both the interdiction of illegal drugs and in defending the country against terrorist 
attacks. The porosity and openness of Turkey’s Iraq border have been a problem 
in counterterrorism. The Qandil Mountains, which are located south of the 
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Turkey-Iraq border, provide an operations center as well as tactical and practical 
advantages for the terrorists. Combined with the rugged topography of the 
region, border porosity creates a passage for terrorist groups to move material 
and personnel. The terrain also makes it difficult for military outposts to support 
each other. In order to decrease illegal activities, including terrorism, effective 
border monitoring is essential. Detection of terrorist threats is vital for the safety 
of the border region, assets along the borders, and security of the whole country. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), aerial vehicles that can be piloted 
remotely, are a critical component of modern day intelligence, reconnaissance, 
and surveillance (ISR). Technical capabilities of UAVs can be used to improve 
coverage along borders. Advanced Electro-Optical (E-O) identification 
technology, UAV loiter capability, the range of UAVs compared to other patrol 
assets, and their low price explains why UAVs should play a key role in ISR 
missions. The growing demand for UAVs is also based on avoiding military 
casualties. In terms of today’s casualty averse military environment, the 
consequences of losing an airman and a UAV cannot be compared. UAVs can 
be designed to fly under extreme conditions that are risky for pilots. They can fly 
over extreme altitudes for extended periods without suffering the emotional and 
physical effects experienced by humans. UAVs also improve situational 
awareness. However, their effectiveness is highly dependent on the 
characteristics of the region in which they are deployed. This thesis examines the 
effectiveness of UAVs in helping secure a border characterized by rough terrain 
and active terrorists. 
The baseline incursion scenario analyzed in this research was developed, 
based on a skirmish between a guerilla team and a battalion in the Southeast 
region of Turkey, using Map Aware Non Uniform Automata (MANA). For this 
thesis, 87 km of the Turkey-Iraq border was chosen as the area of interest to 
model five different scenarios including different numbers of UAVs (0 up to 4). 
The following image provides an overview to the battlefield with the agents for 
the scenario with one UAV.  
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Overview of scenario including one UAV. 
UAVs are responsible for monitoring the 87 km border, which is divided 
into Areas of Responsibility (AORs) (from 0 up to 4). Each UAV is capable of 
detecting, classifying, and tracking illegal entrants. A UAV follows predefined 
waypoints in the default state. Once it detects an activity, it then proceeds to the 
detection area for classification. The UAV tracks the classified agent if it is a Red 
Agent. Otherwise, the UAV keeps following its waypoints. There are two Blue 
Battalions in the model and the destination of Red Agents is set depending on 
the location of these battalions. Red Teams represent the terrorists. There are 
four groups of Red Teams trying to cross the border. Initially, each group is 
located at four different points along the Iraq part of the border. They follow their 
waypoints into Turkey and try to avoid the UAVs along their path. There are 17 
Scouts distributed along the border to provide information on UAV activities to 
the Red Teams. Scouts have a stationary observation point. Scouts are able to 
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extend their sensor range by using binoculars. Neutrals are the agents that 
cause distraction to the UAVs until they are classified as neutral. However, 
Neutrals can provide information on UAV activities to the Red Agents in some 
scenarios.  
Following the creation of the base model, a Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube (NOLH) design is used to provide maximum information from the 
experimental design for the 21 factors in this study. The impact of UAVs on 
detection and classification of terrorists is examined by varying factors in the 
model: such as the number of UAVs, UAV sensor range, UAV speed, number of 
terrorists, detection, classification and communication range of terrorist and 
scouts, etc. In addition to the factors varied in the design, there are also 13 
dependent input variables that are set as a function of some factors: UAV 
classification range, UAV classification probability, time between detections, and 
UAV fuel usage rate. The resulting experimental design is crossed with the 
number of UAVs (1 up to 4). Afterwards, each of the 512 design points is 
replicated 200 times, producing a final data set of 103,200 observations. 
Descriptive statistics, stepwise linear regression, lasso regression, 
regression trees, and random forests are used to analyze 103,200 simulated 
terrorist incursions. The analysis techniques highlight similar factors as the most 
important factors, plus with additional insights. The following list summarizes the 
primary findings of our analysis conducted based on the results of scenarios: 
• Agent-based models provide us a modeling platform to create and 
analyze scenarios in a short time period. 
• The data farming process is a powerful technique to study the 
effects of numerous factors simultaneously.   
• The use of UAVs significantly enhances the detection and 
classification of terrorists operating or transiting in the region. 
• The classification range of a UAV has a strong positive affect in the 
number of classified terrorists. The first split in the regression tree 
analysis highlights the importance of having a classification range 
greater than 5 km.  
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• The sensor range of terrorists to detect UAVs has a negative 
impact on the number of classified terrorists. Even though UAV 
altitude is not highlighted as a significant factor, assigning UAVs at 
higher altitudes can reduce their probability of detection by 
terrorists. 
• The classification probability of a UAV is also important. A 1% 
increase in classification probability results in more classified 
terrorists. Additionally, regression tree analysis yields that a 
maximum range (≥ 5000 meters) classification probability greater 
than 0.17 provides better results in the classification of terrorists. 
From a practical sense, classification probability of a camera, which 
is onboard the UAV, leads to the number of effective looks needed 
to search an area. So, this is an important factor to take into 
account in terms of mission plan and organization. 
• We cannot talk about an optimal number of UAVs to assign over 
the area of interest, but regression tree analysis indicates that 
assigning three or more UAVs results in more classified terrorists 
with a lower variance. 
• The time between detections of entities is another important factor 
in terms of a UAV’s classification capability. A one second 
increment of time between detections in the default state causes a 
larger decrease in the number of classified terrorists than a one 
second increment of time between detections in enemy contact 
state.  
• Refueling time is a bigger determinant of success than the initial 
fuel level of a UAV. Thus, it is important for ground bases to be able 
to quickly get the UAVs back up. 
• Increasing the UAV’s speed in the default state has a negative 
impact on UAV classification performance. Regression tree 
analysis shows that UAV speeds higher than 250 km/hr noticeably 
decreases the number of classified terrorists. Therefore, the speed 
of flight is critical. If it is too high, UAVs will quickly occupy images 
of the terrain and will miss the details. On the contrary, if the speed 
is too low, then there will be less variation in the occupied image, 
hence less information will be gathered through the scans.  
• The existence of communication links between the civilians and 
terrorists is another significant factor on UAV performance. The 
existence of civilian communication with terrorists caused a 
reduction in the number of classified terrorists. Therefore, SIGINT 
and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities should be considered in 
addition to UAV performance characteristics. 
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“The future is in the skies.” 
– Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
A. BACKGROUND 
Border security is of great importance to most countries. Many countries 
spend a significant portion of their budget protecting their border against 
terrorists, smugglers, and illegal immigrants. Illegal activities cause direct effects, 
especially for the regions adjacent to borders, and indirect effects for the entire 
country. Turkey has been in conflict with terrorist groups since the 1980s. Up to 
now, more than 40,000 people have been killed, including Turkish soldiers and 
civilians [1].  Terrorist activities have also ruined the socioeconomic and social 
stability of the region. 
1. Overview of Turkey’s Borders 
Turkey is a Eurasian country located in Western Asia and Southeastern 
Europe. The country has a total of 2,627 kilometers of land boundaries and 7,200 
kilometers of coastline. Turkey is bordered by eight countries: Bulgaria, Greece, 
Syria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, and Iraq [2]. A majority of the terrorist 
infiltrations take place from Iraq. In Turkey, conventional Turkish military and 
police forces play a key role in both the interdiction of illegal drugs and in 
defending the country against terrorist attacks. 
The porosity and openness of Turkey’s Iraq border have been a problem 
in counterterrorism. The Qandil Mountains, which are located south of the 
Turkey-Iraq border, provide an operations center as well as tactical and practical 
advantages for the terrorists [3]. Combined with the rugged topography of the 
region, border porosity creates a passage for terrorist groups to move material 
and personnel. The terrain also makes it difficult for military outposts to support 
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each other. In order to decrease illegal activities, including terrorism, effective 
border monitoring is essential.   
2. Overview of Terrorist Activities 
The preeminent terrorist threat coming from Turkey’s borders is the 
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is an armed Kurdish organization 
struggling with Turkey. The organization is also listed as a foreign terrorist 
organization by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) [4]. The southeast (SE) 
border of Turkey contains the majority of terrorist activities. The region is known 
for its steep mountains and deep dales. Thus, the soldiers protecting the border 
have limited lines-of-sight (LOS). These conditions reduce the probability of 
detecting PKK militants operating or transiting in the region.  
PKK groups are well adapted to hard conditions and the environment. 
Most of their plans take advantage of the geography of the region. The bridges 
are the only connection between some regions and Turkish battalions. This well-
known weakness can be used to increase the response time by keeping 
reinforcement teams away from an attacked Turkish asset.  
The PKK terrorist organization also takes advantage of the gaps along the 
border in its illegal drug trafficking, which supports the organization financially. 
Terrorists use ever changing guerilla tactics. They cross over the border to attack 
military outposts and to bring explosives for use in bomb attacks in urban areas. 
Simultaneous raids are a recently used tactic of the terrorist organization. In 
addition to military stations, the terrorists attack military and police lodgings, 
prefectures, and government agencies. News from the world press reflects how 
terrorist attacks pose a severe threat to the safety of the Turkish people:    
PKK rebels launched a series of attacks against security forces and 
village guardsmen within three Turkish provinces; Şırnak, Siirt, 
Antakya. [5] 
PKK militants clashed with Turkish soldiers near the town of 
Cukurca, within the Hakkari Province, in the south-east of the 
country. [6] 
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A bomb explosion occurred next to a military bus carrying Turkish 
soldiers and their relatives in Turkey’s largest city of Istanbul. PKK 
militants are being suspected for carrying out this latest attack. [7] 
Around 100 suspected PKK fighters simultaneously attacked four 
government and security buildings in the small town of 
Beytüşşebap, near the border with Syria. At least 10 soldiers and 3 
attackers were killed during the assault, while 7 soldiers were 
injured. [8] 
A roadside bombing in Turkey’s southeastern Bingol Province killed 
8 soldiers and injured 9 others, less than a day after 4 officers were 
killed in an attack near the borders with Iran and Iraq. [9] [10] 
An explosive device hidden in a car exploded as an Army patrol 
was passing by in the eastern Turkish city of Tunceli, killing 6 
soldiers and a civilian. Several others were injured in the blast, 
which authorities blamed on the PKK. [11] 
A group of suspected PKK fighters attacked a Turkish Army convoy 
with rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire in the country’s 
southeast. At least one bus was completely destroyed, killing 10 
soldiers and leaving more than 60 others injured. Witnesses later 
reported seeing military F-16 jets taking off from the air base in 
Diyarbakir. [12] 
Detection of terrorist threats is essential for the safety of borders, assets 
along the borders, and security of the whole country. The goal is to completely 
prevent terrorist groups from accessing Turkey through the border. Once this 
step is taken, the majority of the terrorists’ resources will be confined. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research is guided by the following questions: 
1. Can Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) help detect and classify 
terrorists over a region characterized by rough topographical 
conditions and active terrorists? 
 
2. Can UAVs provide early warnings of terrorist attacks, and how many 
terrorists can be detected?  
 
3. What number of UAVs and performance characteristics best contribute 
to border security? 
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4. How do changes in our scenario affect the ability of the UAVs to 
provide early warning? 
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS  
UAVs, aerial vehicles that can be piloted remotely, are a critical 
component of modern day reconnaissance and surveillance. UAVs came onto 
the stage in the 1990s. UAVs successfully addressed the deficiency of manned 
ISR assets in the Gulf War by providing enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities [13], [14]. Additionally, the DoD Report on 
Desert STORM points out that “UAVs proved excellent at providing an 
immediately responsive intelligence collection capability” [13], [15]. Technical 
capabilities of UAVs can be used to improve coverage along borders. Advanced 
Electro-Optical (E-O) identification technology, UAV loiter capability, the range of 
UAVs compared to other patrol assets, and their low price explains why UAVs 
should play a key role in ISR missions. The growing demand for UAVs is also 
based on avoiding military casualties. In terms of today’s casualty averse military 
environment, the consequences of losing an airman and a UAV cannot be 
compared. Manned systems and UAVs can accomplish many of the same tasks. 
But “UAVs have gained favor as a way to reduce risk to combat troops, the cost 
of hardware, and the reaction time in a surgical strike” [16], [17] and “to conduct 
missions in areas that are difficult to access or otherwise considered too high-risk 
for manned aircraft or personnel on the ground” [16], [18]. 
UAVs can be designed to fly under extreme conditions that are risky for 
pilots. They can fly over extreme altitudes for extended periods without suffering 
the emotional and physical effects experienced by humans. UAVs also improve 
situational awareness. Hence, the reason unmanned air systems (UAS) appeal 
to the military is explained in Department of Defense Appropriations Bill of Fiscal 
Year 2003 as follows:   
In today’s military, unmanned systems are highly desired by 
combatant commanders for their versatility and persistence. By 
performing tasks such as surveillance; signals intelligence 
(SIGINT); precision target designation; mine detection; and 
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chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance, 
unmanned systems have made key contributions to the Global War 
on Terror. [19] 
However, their effectiveness is highly dependent on the characteristics of 
the region in which they are deployed. This thesis examines the effectiveness of 
UAVs in helping secure a border characterized by rough terrain and active 
terrorists. For this purpose, 87 kilometers of Turkey’s border with Iraq is modeled 
in MANA (Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata). The impact of UAVs on detection 
and classification of terrorists who use the southeast border, characterized by 
rough terrain, as passage from Northern Iraq into Turkey is examined by varying 
the following factors in the model: the number of UAVs, UAV sensor range, UAV 
speed, number of terrorists, detection, classification, and communication range of 
terrorists and scouts, etcetera. This analysis explains the relationships between a 
variety of input factors used in the detection and classification process and 
performance measures. 
The rough topography of the region can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, 
which depict sections of the southeast part of Turkey. Terrorists have to walk 
long distances in rough terrain while crossing the border. Due to these 
challenging conditions, terrorists need plenty of time to reach their destination. 
This time period can be turned into an advantage with an efficient UAV network 
over the region to enhance situational awareness and real-time imagery. UAVs 
can detect terrorists before they attack Turkish assets. They can even interrupt 
the logistic and personnel support chain of terrorists. The priceless benefit of 









Figure 2. A picture from the SE border. Image from Milliyet.com.tr. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review on border security, terrorist activities, and UAVs reveals 
that many students at NPS have studied similar problems using the simulation 
environment Map Aware Non Uniform Automata (MANA). Seven studies, four 
NPS student theses and three other research studies that address similar 
problems, are reviewed below. 
In his thesis, Oh (2010) examines the border security problem of the ROK 
Army [20]. He develops a model in MANA to measure the time needed by an 
enemy to reach a waypoint and the probability of enemy mission failure. The 
results of his study provide insights on deciding a structure for border security.   
The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of New Zealand 
published the Maritime Patrol Review (MPR) in 2001. The review, which was 
driven by the planned $600M sensor system upgrade to the RNZAF’s P-3 Orion 
maritime patrol aircraft, highlighted the poor state of maritime domain awareness 
in New Zealand in general and of maritime aerial surveillance in particular. Illegal 
fishing, drug smuggling, illegal immigration, terrorist activity, energy security, and 
transnational crime are some of the many threats to their maritime security. In his 
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thesis, Oliver (2009) examines the effects of UAVs on New Zealand’s maritime 
security and claims that UAVs provide a credible option to manned aircraft [21]. 
In his thesis, Yildiz (2009) explores the use of mini Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (mini UAVs) along with other assets to enhance border protection [22]. 
A part of the Tucson sector in Arizona is modeled in an agent-based model 
(MANA) for this purpose. The result of his study shows that the use of mini UAVs 
is useful in interdiction of illegal entrants and provides an enhancement of border 
security.   
In his thesis, Sulewski (2005) analyzes the effect of UAVs in the Army’s 
Future Combat Systems family of systems [23]. He builds a simulation model to 
determine how the numbers and the capabilities of UAVs affect a Future Force 
Combined Arms Battalion’s (CAB’s) ability to secure an objective. He conducts 
46,440 computational experiments by varying many factors, including UAV 
capabilities. He finds that the UAVs, their capabilities, and tactics are significant 
factors on a CAB’s performance. 
In his study, Raffetto (2004) develops a model in MANA to analyze the 
effect of UAV characteristics on ISR missions for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) commander in 2015 [24]. As a result, he contends that the UAV 
characteristics, such as airspeed, endurance, sweep width, and sensor capability 
are beneficial in terms of intelligence gathering. 
Bertsche and Schwarz (2002) develop a model in MANA to analyze 
another scenario: “Protection of Stationary Potential Terrorist Targets” [25]. They 
state that agent-based models offer a better solution for modeling the problem 
where traditional operation research (OR) analysis is limited in explaining 
intangible factors such as persistence and courage. The results of their study 
yield significant results for the scenarios studied. 
Butler’s (2001) research report indicates that UAVs with advanced 
sensors are an integral part of Twenty-first Century ISR missions [13]. The 
results of the study show that the U.S Air Force should continue to use UAVs for 
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This chapter discusses the agent-based modeling platform Map Aware 
Non Uniform Automata (MANA), which is used for this study. First, we provide 
the definition and benefits of agent-based models. Second, we present the 
definition and evolution of advances in MANA, with several example studies. 
Finally, we explain why MANA is chosen as the modeling platform to conduct this 
study. 
A. AGENT-BASED MODELING 
Agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) has gained prominence 
lately with the growing interest in agent-based modeling, sophisticated modeling 
software, advanced computer technology, and the need for data. ABMS is used 
to model complex systems consisting of autonomous agents that interact with 
other agents and their environment. Sanchez and Thomas describe agent-based 
simulations as models in which multiple entities sense and stochastically respond 
to other agents and the conditions in their local environments, mimicking complex 
large scale system behavior [26].  In an agent-based model, autonomous 
decision making entities (which can be people, vehicles, ships, aircraft, animals, 
etc.) follow a set of predefined rules and algorithms that are coded based on 
personality weightings, movement algorithms, and penalty functions. Global 
behaviors then arise as a result of interactions of individual relationships. 
The benefits of ABMS, over other modeling techniques, can be explained 
in the following three statements [27]: 
1. ABMS captures emergent behaviors resulting from the interactions of 
individual entities.  
2. ABMS is the most natural way of describing and simulating a system 
composed of “behavioral” entities. Agent behaviors can be represented 
explicitly within a range of options. 
3. ABMS provides flexibility along multiple dimensions. One can use 
ABMS when the complexity is unknown and requires some effort.   
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Decision makers need detailed information on today’s high technology 
products, many of which are costly to acquire. Modeling and simulation play a 
key role in gaining insights about these systems under limited budget and time 
when actual data is not available or limited. MANA-V (Map Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata-Vector), an agent-based distillation model [28] that is broadly used in 
military operations analysis, is used to model the border area in this study.  
Figure 3 provides the Terms-of-Use screen and general information about the 
developers and the version of MANA. The following sections provide an overview 
of MANA based mostly on the user’s manual. 
 
Figure 3. MANA terms-of-use screen. 
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B. EVOLUTION OF MANA 
MANA is a stochastic, time-step software package designed to facilitate 
building and conducting combat simulations. MANA has been and continues to 
be developed by the Operations Analysis Section of New Zealand’s Defense 
Technology Agency (DTA). DTA was inspired by the pioneering efforts of 
Ilachinski’s agent-based models ISAAC and EINSTein [28]. These models 
helped DTA to see that a small scale, flexible model can be more suitable than a 
detailed simulation for the requirements of the New Zealand Defense Force 
(NZDF). Additionally, DTA realizes that automaton models can be used for 
analysis purposes. Nonetheless, DTA is well aware that they need to improve 
automaton style models to fully replace the older large scale models.  
In 2000, DTA took the first step of improvement with the “Situational 
Awareness Map,” using MATLAB. Afterwards, the programming language 
changed with the more flexible programming language Delphi. In general, MANA 
is designed as a scenario analysis model. Situational awareness, communication 
links, terrain map, waypoints, and event-driven personality changes are the 
strengths of MANA over most other agent-based models. The evolutionary steps 
of MANA are as follows [29]. 
1. MANA 2 (2002/2003) 
As the first available version of MANA, this version forms the basis of 
ensuing models. MANA 2 consists of primary movement weightings, terrain 
editing features, sensor and weapon characteristics: simple cookie-cutter 
scheme or with tables of range-dependent probabilities, squad-based agent 
property definition, and shared situational awareness (SA) maps. SA maps can 
be used to model fundamental aspects of Network Centric Warfare (NCW).   
Wolf (2003) used MANA version 2 to build his model about logistic support 
operations  [30]. He analyzed the potential of ABMs for logistical decision making 
and mission success. He claims that ABMs are very useful in exploring highly 
complex scenarios.  
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2. MANA 3 (2003/2004) 
A detailed NCW is possible in this version with an improvement to the 
squad SA map, communication links, and information sharing between agents. 
Supplemental movement algorithms allow agents to determine their movement 
based on information flow between other agents. Expanded data farming 
capabilities, special aircraft algorithms, and search algorithms are also 
introduced with this version.  
Pfeiffer (2006) used MANA version 3.2.1 to exam the various factors that 
affect convoy missions in an urban environment [31]. He claims that MANA can 
produce useful insight even though it has limitations. Tiburcio (2005) utilizes 
MANA version 3.0.37 in his study of maritime protection of critical infrastructure 
assets in the Campeche Sound [32]. Cason (2004) developed a simulation model 
using MANA version 3 to reveal significant factors of UAVs in an urban infantry 
patrolling operation [33]. Aydin (2004) also conducts his study, “An Exploration 
Analysis of Village Search Operations,” using MANA version 3.0. He investigates 
a village search operation that takes place in southeastern Turkey. He 
commends the efficiency of MANA “at exploring the factors affecting the non-
linear nature of a search operation and the emergent behavior in low intensity 
conflicts” [34]. 
3. MANA 4 (2005/2006) 
“Human-in-the-loop” studies are now possible with the new data streaming 
capability of this version. A battlefield zoom property, a genetic algorithm, a data 
analysis tool, finite sensor and weapon apertures, angular additions to the 
movement algorithms that include direction of facing, and squad formation 
shapes are the primary additional features of MANA version 4.   
Oh (2010) utilizes MANA version 4 in his study on ROK Army border 
security problems because of the limitations in the alternatives [20]. Singham, 
Therkildsen, and Schruben use MANA version 4 in their analysis on flocking 
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algorithms to input modeling for agent movement [35]. Yildiz (2009) develops a 
model using MANA version 4.04.1 for his study [22]. 
4. MANA 5 (2006/2013) 
There is a conceptual change in this latest version. Grid-based movement 
algorithms, which are used in all previous versions of MANA, are now converted 
to vector based movement algorithms. Figure 3 provides insight into both 
approaches. In previous versions of MANA, agents in the battlefield move grid 
square to grid square in each time step depending on model set-up. The next 
grid that an agent is about to move can involve enemy, neutral, friendly units, and 
terrain features. The user defined personalities constitute the basis of agent 
behaviors. 
In the latest version, agents in the battlefield calculate a vector, such as 
FE, FT, FW given in Figure 4, toward all other entities of interest and terrain within 
sensor range or depending on information provided by inorganic contacts. The 
product of these vectors and the personality weightings generate the final vector. 
The agent movement is calculated based on Newton’s second law and standard 
kinematic equations for constant acceleration. 
 
Figure 4. Two different approaches to calculate movement: The grid-based 
(right), the vector based (left) (From: MANA user manual). 
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The advantages of vector based algorithms are explained in the MANA 
user manual as follows: 
1. Larger battlefields can be modeled. 
2. Battlefield region, agents speeds, sensor, and weapon characteristics 
can be defined in terms of real world units. Therefore, MANA users no 
longer have to convert real-world units to model units.  
3. New features can be easily added to models and scenarios. 
 
The rest of the model properties remain almost unchanged. Therefore, the 
developers publish the MANA-V user manual as a supplementary document to 
the MANA 4 user manual.  
C. WHY MANA 
MANA version 5.01.03 is chosen as the modeling tool to support this 
research. In MANA, agents are aware of their local environment, terrain, and 
battlefield activities. Agent behaviors are determined based on their activities, 
goals, and terrain type. However, all agents are not necessarily reacting in the 
same manner. They respond to events according to personality weightings and 
information provided by organic and/or inorganic SA maps.   
MANA requires a shorter training period than most other comparable 
modeling environments. The simple graphical user interface (GUI) allows users 
to build scenarios in a short time period. Furthermore, MANA has an “on-the-fly” 
editing capability. Users can edit scenarios at the time updates are needed. 
Primarily, analysts prefer MANA because of their limited time to grasp dynamics 
of the real life situations for programming into higher resolution models.   
Agent behaviors in MANA are controlled by decision making algorithms. 
Therefore, agents react based on personalities, not orders. The interaction of 
agents can be analyzed in MANA. Agents may change their personalities as a 
result of triggering events. Built-in data farming capabilities allow users to readily 
explore parameter variables in their model.  
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Unlike other highly detailed agent-based models, MANA reflects only the 
essential details of a scenario. “It is a myth that a more detailed model is 
necessarily a better model, because it is impossible to capture accurately every 
aspect of nature” [28]. The more complex a model is the less transparent it is. 
Hence, it would be difficult to model local relationships of this geography based 
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III. SCENARIO AND MODEL DEVOLOPMENT 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
                  –George Box 
In this chapter, we provide detailed information on scenario and model 
development. First, we explain a real-life skirmish that motivates the baseline 
scenario analyzed in this study. Second, we cover all models developed based 
on this skirmish. Third, we describe the battlefield and terrain features. Finally, 
we introduce the agents in the model.    
A. SCENARIO 
The baseline scenario analyzed in this research is based on a skirmish 
between a guerilla team and a Turkish battalion in the Southeast region of 
Turkey. In October 2007, an estimated 150 to 200 terrorists attacked an infantry 
battalion located near the Southeast border of Turkey with Iraq. The nearest 
friendly force was situated 5.5km directly behind the attacked battalion. Because 
of the hard terrain, the two battalions were connected to each other via a bridge, 
which was the only way of land transport, over a river. 
Using information from news reports of the attack, the Blue forces, which 
represent the friendly side in this scenario, are composed of 50 infantrymen, two 
cannons, rocket projectors, and grenades. The commander positions the 
personnel to watch the area for terrorist activity. Figure 5 depicts a picture of the 
attacked battalion. Field-of-vision is a major problem when considering the 
rugged characteristic of the province, especially during the night. The Red forces, 
which represent the terrorists, are composed of 150 to 200 guerillas equipped 
with grenades, bazookas, and other small arms. The terrorists split into three 
groups. Two of the groups carry out missions before commencement of the main 
assault. The purpose of the remaining terrorists is to directly attack the battalion. 
The Blue forces are well trained and equipped, but the Red side has the 
advantage of easy adaptation to rough terrain. The terrorists use the terrain to 
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increase their effectiveness. Additionally, the Blue side has no intelligence about 
the attack, so the terrorists have the advantage of surprise. 
 
Figure 5. A view of the attacked battalion (From: Haberler.com). 
The Red side conducts reconnaissance activities to gather necessary 
information and intelligence about the region and Blue forces, and plan their 
attack based on this information. The length of the pre-attack period mostly 
depends on the infiltrators, who stay covered all the time and act as neutral 
parties. Since the Red commander wants to ensure the success of the attack, he 
assigns three of his subordinates as a leader for each group. Following the 
planning step, the guerilla team enters Turkey through the northern Iraq border 
around 2330. They split into groups as planned, and the first group of 10 guerillas 
goes to the village and cuts the electricity and telephone lines before 
commencement of the attack. The second group of 20 guerillas blows up the only 
bridge to the outpost. Then, these two groups combine into a single team to stop 
or delay any reinforcement. Meanwhile, the third group proceeds to their initial 
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position. Once they take position, four of the terrorists form a recon team and 
start close defensive fire at around 0200 to reveal the location of the battalion so 
that the attackers located on another mountain across from the battalion can aim 
their shots. One of the critical issues for the Red side is time. In general, guerilla 
teams avoid long engagements. But, in this case, they are well-prepared and 
outnumber the isolated Blue side by a factor of four. So, the plan is to overrun the 
outpost before reinforcements arrive. Conversely, the Blue side tries to stay 
close, with a minimum of friendly losses, to keep coordination and 
communication as effective as possible, and to hinder the Red side from 
capturing the battalion. 
The salient point of the summary is the Blue force’s lack of intelligence 
and detection until Red attacks. This study of the baseline scenario focuses on 
detection of Red members before they cross the border or before they reach their 
attack points. Therefore, no skirmish between the Red and Blue sides is explicitly 
modeled. For this purpose, five different versions of the scenario are analyzed to 
derive the effectiveness of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (from 0 up to 4) 
assigned over the area of interest.   
 
1. Baseline Scenario 
This scenario is based on the skirmish explained above. This baseline 
scenario includes all of the agents except UAVs. There are 150 terrorists, divided 
in four groups, which try to cross the border and make their way to their attack 
positions. Initial runs of the baseline scenario help us quantify how many of the 
Red Agents will reach the final waypoint without UAV detection, as in reality, 
during the predefined maximum time limit. Even though Scouts, Civilians, and a 
Blue Killing Agent exist in the scenario, they do not have any effect on the result 
for this specific scenario.  
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2. Scenario Two 
There is only one area of responsibility (AOR) and one UAV in this 
scenario. This is the extension of the baseline scenario with one UAV over the 
whole area of interest. The screenshot in Figure 6 depicts the placement of one 
UAV and the other agents. The terrain types are modeled using different colors. 
The roads are colored as yellow. The dark brown and light brown colors 
represent the mountains and off-road areas. We add a grey colored layer to the 
terrain to facilitate visualization of the border region.  
 
Figure 6. Scenario two developed using MANA. 
3. Scenario Three 
The baseline scenario was again updated, this time adding two AORs and 












the third scenario allows us to see how the number of Blue and Red casualties 
changes depending on the number of UAVs, two in this case. The screenshot in 
Figure 7 shows the position of the two UAVs, based on the AORs, and the other 
agents. 
 
Figure 7. Scenario three developed using MANA. 
4. Scenario Four 
Scenario four, the fourth updated version of the baseline scenario, 
consists of three AORs and three UAVs. There are no other differences between 
the scenarios in terms of agent placement or parameter and factor set up. This 
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scenario allows us to see the effect of three UAVs, shown in Figure 8, on the 
results.  
 
Figure 8. Scenario four developed using MANA. 
5. Scenario Five 
As the final extended version of the baseline scenario, the fifth scenario, 
comprises four AORs and four UAVs. The only difference between the modified 
scenarios and baseline scenario is the number of AORs and the number of 
UAVs. The purpose of Scenarios Two though Five is to see how the outcome of 
the model changes with the number of UAVs. Therefore, all other aspects of the 
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model, including the design of experiment, are kept constant. The screen capture 
in Figure 9 displays the positions of UAVs on the battlefield for this scenario.    
 
Figure 9. Scenario five developed using MANA. 
B. BATTLEFIELD 
In MANA, the battlefield is a bounded area on which all entities are placed. 
For this study, the battlefield represents an 87 x 108 km border region in the 
Southeast part of Turkey. Battlefield distances, sensor ranges, and weapon 
ranges are defined continuously in terms of real world units (meters).  
The battlefield consists of three types of maps: Background, Terrain, and 
Elevation maps. The background map is used on top of the battlefield for 
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cosmetic purposes to improve visualization of the scenario. The background map 
has no effect on going, concealment, and cover. The terrain map includes terrain 
features for each terrain type used in the model, such as roads, mountains, etc., 
that agents can follow and use for concealment or cover. Three different RGB 
color codes are used to define each terrain type. Terrain types have distinctive 
characteristics in terms of going, concealment, and cover. Possible going, 
concealment, and cover values range from 0.0 to 1.0 and affect agents’ speed, 
sensor capability for detection and classification, as well as terrain protection 
from weapon fires, respectively. Terrain map and terrain features are provided in 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Terrain map and terrain features. 
The elevation map, which consists of greyscale colors, is used to define 
elevation features of the terrain. For this study, the real world elevation range is 
defined from 640 meters to 3185 meters. The elevation map used in this study is 
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depicted in Figure 11. The white and black colors in the elevation map represent 
the highest and lowest point of the region respectively. In the terrain map, the 
white areas are formed as mountains. Terrain and elevation maps affect the 
speed and LOS calculations of the agents. The multipliers given for the terrain 
types are used when computing the movement speed, sensor detection 
associated with the concealment factor, and hit rate that affects the shot 
probabilities. The LOS is calculated based on the sensor height of each agent 
and elevation ranges defined for the elevation map.  
 
Figure 11. Elevation map. 
The elevation data is downloaded from the EarthExplorer website, in 
Digital Elevation Model (DEM) format. The elevation range changes between 640 
meters to 3185 meters. Then, the ArcMap, a part of the ArcGIS toolbox, is used 
to view the elevation data, mark off the desired play box, make note of the 
highest and lowest points of elevation, and export a picture of it. Finally, 
Paint.Net is used to convert the picture to bitmap (BMP) format and resize it so 
that it will allow adequate resolution for the selected play board. 
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The ArcMap and EarthExplorer are again used to acquire different views 
of the terrain to support the creation of the terrain map. Paint.Net and Adobe 
Photoshop CS6 software are used to generate layers for different terrain types. 
The final product is flattened into a BMP image that MANA understands. 
The time step of all the simulation runs is set at five seconds. Initially, the 
entire model was developed using a time step of one second. A time step of one 
took too long to run. Therefore, experiments were conducted with the values 
three, five, and ten to see how the model runs with these time steps. The model 
runs show that a time step of ten seconds is an ineffectual candidate because it 
causes the model to change states in an unexplained pattern. So, to avoid 
incorrect results, a time step of five seconds is selected. However, the model still 
requires plenty of time for a complete run. Consequently, the maximum time step 
is defined as 9000 time steps. This corresponds to twelve and a half hours in real 
life. The baseline model yields that this number is adequate for half of the Red 
members, on average, to reach their final waypoints.  
While dealing with the time step, it was found that time in “Fuel Out” state 
is not defined in terms of seconds as stated in the “Edit Squad Properties” panel 
and user’s manual. In fact, the duration in this state is defined as time steps. 
Additionally, the first two seconds of “Spare 1” state, which is used for refueling 
purposes in this study, is ignored and refueling starts at the third second. (These 
problems have been reported to the developers.) 
C. AGENT DESCRIPTIONS  
Squads constitute the key unit of Map Aware Non Uniform Automata 
(MANA). The maximum number of squads in a scenario is 32,767. The number 
of agents in a squad can be between 1 and 1000. There are 13 squads in this 




Table 1.   Agents and features. 
Squad Name Allegiance Threat level Class 
1 Blue_UAV1 1 3 1 
2 Blue_UAV2 1 3 1 
3 Blue_UAV3 1 3 1 
4 Blue_UAV4 1 3 1 
5 Blue Battalion 1 3 0 
6 Red_Team1 2 3 2 
7 Red_Team2 2 3 2 
8 Red_Team3 2 3 2 
9 Red_Team4 2 3 2 
10 Red Scouts 2 3 3 
11 Civilians (Neutrals) 0 2 4 
12 Blue Killing Agent 1 3 5 
13 Blue Targets 1 2 6 
The allegiance represents the agent’s side in the battle. The allegiance of 
an agent can be friend, enemy, or neutral. Threat levels and class parameters 
are used to define different types of agents in a scenario. For example, UAVs 
and Blue Killing Agent are allied, but they are equipped differently, and their task 
in the scenario is also different. So, threat levels and class parameters help 
distinguish these agents in the scenario. 
The placement of agents onto the battle field is shown in Figure 12. The 
Red Team, divided in four groups, starts on the Iraq side of the border. Scouts 
are located along the border so that they can provide information on UAV 
activities. The Civilians are distributed around the battlefield. Each UAV, which is 




Figure 12. Overview of battlefield with all agents. 
1. Blue UAVs 
Blue UAVs are responsible for monitoring the 87 km border, which is 
divided into AORs (from 0 up to 4). The personality weightings and trigger states 
for UAVs are shown in Figure 13. The personality weightings are set using a 
slide bar and can take values between -100 and 100. Positive values indicate a 
positive propensity towards the associated personality, while negative values 
indicate a negative propensity. Personality settings other than the default value of 
zero are shown in red. To ensure that UAVs will not engage the same group of 
Red Agent, personality weightings towards friends are set to -100 in all states. At 
the beginning of each model run, UAVs directly fall into the run start state, which 
allows UAVs to start patrolling at random and different times. Each UAV is 
capable of detecting, classifying, and tracking illegal entrants. A UAV follows 
predefined waypoints in the default state. Once it detects an activity, it then 
proceeds to the detection area for classification. The UAV tracks the classified 
agent if it is a Red Agent and sends the information to the Blue Killing Agent. 
Otherwise, the UAV keeps following its waypoints. 
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Figure 13. Blue UAV squad personalities and trigger states. 
The Inorganic Squad SA panel controls the flow of information among the 
squads. The communication link parameters are invariant within the trigger 
states. UAVs have a communication capability with the Blue Killing Agent as 
shown in Figure 14. To prevent multiple detections, the communication latency 
parameter is set to zero.  
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Figure 14. Blue UAV inorganic SA communication link parameters. 
There is no specific refueling strategy for the UAVs. When low on fuel, 
they jump into the “Fuel Out” state and go to their alternative waypoint for 
refueling. UAVs have a strong propensity to go directly to their alternative 
waypoint in Fuel Out state (Alternative Waypoint weighting is set to 100). The 
refueling state has the highest priority. Therefore, UAVs cannot be interrupted by 
any other activity. 
2. Blue Battalions 
There are two Blue Battalions, which provide final waypoints for Red 
Agents. The final waypoints for the Red Agents are set depending on the location 
of the battalions.  
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3. Red Teams 
Red Teams represent the terrorists. There are four groups of Red Teams 
trying to cross the border. The personality weightings and trigger states are 
shown in Figure 15. Initially, each group is located at four different points along 
the Iraq side of the border. The Red Teams are the most valuable target, with a 
threat level of three. They follow their waypoints into Turkey and try to avoid 
UAVs along their path. They have a strong negative propensity towards UAVs 
(Enemy Threat 3 weighting is set to -100) and a desire for concealment. 
 





Red Agents have no communication capability with other agents, but they 
can get information on UAV activities via Scouts in the base model and via 
Scouts and Civilians in the additional scenarios. Once Red Agents are classified 
by UAVs, they are devolved to the Blue Killing Agent.  
Red Agents increase their concealment value to 100% in all enemy 
contact states except for the Enemy Contact 2 state in which they make contact 
with Blue Targets. The experience of terrorist teams and the harsh terrain of the 
region allow terrorists to have a perfect stealth value in most cases. This higher 
concealment value allows us to see the effectiveness of UAVs in worst case 
conditions. Once they reach the final waypoint, each Red Agent kills one Blue 
Target and becomes invisible so as not to be detected and killed. This allows us 
to count how many terrorists reach their destination undetected in the allotted 
time.  
Each Red Agent has a weapon that can fire within a range of 600 meters. 
The Red Agent’s weapon parameters are set as in Figure 16. The amount of 
ammunition for each weapon is set to one to ensure that each Red Agent, who 
reaches the final waypoint, will kill only one Blue Target. Civilians, UAVs, and 
Blue Killing Agent are selected as non-target classes to prevent the Red Agent 
from firing on these agents and consuming their ammunition. In this model, 
attrition is used only to record how many Red Agents are detected by a UAV 




Figure 16. Red Agents weapon settings. 
4. Scouts 
There are 17 Scouts, who are invisible to all other entities on the 
battlefield, distributed along the border to provide information about UAV 
activities to the Red Teams. Scouts have a stationary observation point. They are 
able to extend their sensor range by using binoculars. The inorganic SA 
communication links for Scouts are shown in Figure 17. Scouts can communicate 
with Red Teams to provide information on UAV activities. 
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Figure 17. Scouts inorganic SA communication link parameters. 
5. Neutrals 
Neutrals are distributed around the battlefield and given some waypoints 
inside the AOR of UAVs. Having a threat level of two, they are not as valuable as 
Red Agents. Neutrals are the agents that cause distraction to the UAVs until they 
are classified as neutral in the base model. However, they can provide 
information on UAV activities to the Red Agents in some scenarios. In these 
scenarios, Neutrals communicate with Red Agents over a radio and take the 
roles of distractor and infiltrator. 
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6. Blue Killing Agent 
There is one Blue Killing Agent that takes classified Red Agents out of 
action. The Blue Killing Agent has a perfect concealment value and remains 
invisible during the whole scenario. In reality, the information on terrorist 
activities, provided by UAVs, will be transferred to another security unit. Current 
border security architecture does not include UAVs. All information going to the 
Blue Killing Agent flows through the UAVs. Therefore, this agent is used to 
disregard classified Red Agents to avoid counting multiple detections of the same 
Red Agent. The Killing Agent has a perfectly accurate weapon so that it can kill a 
classified Red Agent with one shot. The weapon parameters are shown in Figure 
18. The weapon fire range is set to 100,000 meters. Red Agents and Scouts are 
selected as target classes. The Blue Killing Agent is a modeling tool that kills Red 
Agents depending on the information provided by UAVs.  
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Figure 18. Blue Killing Agent weapon settings. 
7. Blue Targets 
There are four groups of Blue Targets, each with the same number of 
agents as the Red Teams. The Blue Targets are located at the final waypoints of 
the Red Teams. The icon type for this squad is set as zero. Thus, they cannot be 
seen by the users, but they are visible to all battlefield agents. Having a threat 
level of two, they are not a real threat for the Red Agents. They do not have any 
weapons and do not resist Red Agents. Each Blue Target is killed by one Red 
Agent, who has only one bullet. The number of killed Blue Targets forms a 
surrogate for the number of Red Agents who can reach their final waypoint. 




cannot reach the final waypoint at the end of predefined maximum time limit. 
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IV. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS AND MODEL RUNS 
Design of experiment (DOE) techniques allow for obtaining individual and 
interactive effects of factors that affect the results. DOE enables a robust design 
by providing full insight into interactions between design factors. Therefore, DOE 
plays a key role in data collection through simulation runs. In this chapter, we 
discuss the factors and levels which form the experimental design of our study. 
Additionally, we explain the tools and techniques used to automatically run the 
model given the experimental design on the Simulation Experiments and Efficient 
Design (SEED) Center’s (http://harvest.nps.edu) computing cluster. Finally, we 
provide an analysis of model run time given our design. 
A. FACTORS AND LEVELS 
A wide range of factors can be varied by the design to examine their 
effects on the outcome. The factor ranges were selected to cover the capabilities 
of existing UAVs. However, it is practically impossible to examine every possible 
factor and all of their combinations. Therefore, we conduct our analysis for a 
subset of factors that is thought to be most influential on the response. Table 2 
provides the factors and their levels that are used in the experimental design. 
In addition to the factors varied in the design, there are also 13 dependent 
input variables that are set as a function of some of the factors. MANA allows 
users to choose two modes (advanced and cookie cutter) for the sensors. While 
modeling UAVs in the model, “advanced mode” is used for their sensors. 
Therefore, three levels of ranges, time between detection, and their 
corresponding probabilities are defined rather than using only one level. Medium 
and minimum classification ranges are calculated by multiplying maximum range, 
which is explicitly varied in the design, by 3/5 and 1/5. Similarly, medium and 
minimum range classification probabilities are calculated by multiplying maximum 
range classification probability by 2/3 and 1/3. The time between detections for 
medium and minimum levels are set by multiplying maximum time between 
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detections by 2/3 and 1/3. Finally, fuel usage rate in refueling state is computed 
by multiplying initial fuel level by 1/5. The list of dependent variables which form 
design points with factors varied into the design (independent variables) is 
provided in Appendix A. 
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Speed in Default State 450 90 km/hr. continuous 
Speed in Enemy Contact State 300 60 km/hr. continuous 
Height in Default State 5000 2000 M continuous 
Height in Enemy Contact State 4000 1000 M continuous 
Classification Range in Default  
State (Max.) 10000 1000 m continuous 
Classification Range in Enemy  
Contact State (Max.) 10000 1000 m continuous 
Probability of Classification at  
Max. Range in Default State  0.264 0.04   continuous 
Probability of Classification at  
Max. Range in Enemy Contact  State  0.33 0.05   continuous 
Time Between Detection at Default 
 State (Max.) 180 15 seconds continuous 
Time Between Detection at Enemy  
Contact State (Max.) 120 15 seconds continuous 
Fuel Level 21600 2700 seconds continuous 
Time Step in Refueling State 7200 1800 unit continuous 
1440 360 Time steps   
Slew Rate in Enemy Contact State 90 20 
degrees 
(per second) continuous 
Scout 
Sensor Range 3000 600 m continuous 
Communication Range With 
 Red Team 5000 500 m continuous 
Communication Latency With  
Red Team 20 6 Time Step continuous 
Red 
Team 
Sensor Range 3000 200 m continuous 
Intra-Squad Communication Delays 12 6 Time Step continuous 
Civilian 
Communication Link Exist 1 0 (Bernoulli) categorical 
Communication Range With  
Red Team 10000 1000 m continuous 
Communication Latency With  
Red Team 36 12 Time Step continuous 
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1. Controllable Factors 
Factors can be classified as either controllable or uncontrollable. 
Controllable factors can be controlled by the systems developers or operators—
such as the number of UAVs used. They are easy to handle and investigate. In 
our study, controllable factors are the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
parameters that might affect the UAVs’ detection and classification abilities. The 
list of factors associated with UAVs, which are given in Table 2, constitutes the 
controllable factors for this study. Even though the number of UAVs is not directly 
included in the design sheet, it is one of the controllable factors. An experimental 
design is developed for a given scenario, and the whole design is crossed with 
the number of UAVs (1 up to 4). The number of UAVs assigned over the area of 
interest affects the mean coverage ratio over time. Similarly, speed, fuel level, 
and altitude of a UAV impact on the area covered and the endurance. Detection 
range, time between detections, slew rate, and classification probabilities are the 
factors related to the UAV’s sensor(s). The factor, time step in refueling state is 
used to determine how many time steps a UAV is going to spend in their 
refueling state and how long it will be unavailable. The number of UAVs and 
other controllable factors provide a better understanding of the results. How does 
the number of UAVs affect overall performance? Does one UAV with slower 
speed perform better than multiple UAVs with higher speeds? Which 
configuration of UAV provides the best outcome over the alternatives analyzed?  
2. Robust Design 
Robust design is a method pioneered by Dr. Genichi Taguchi and has 
been broadly used to improve engineering productivity [36]. Robust design 
focuses on uncontrollable sources of variation, which may exist in the system or 
the environment, as well as mean performance of the system. In traditional 
experimental design, the impact of uncontrollable factors on the response is often 
assumed to be constant during the experimental runs. But, this approach forms a 
restriction on real world decision making processes. A robust design optimizes 
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the controllable factors in the presence of uncontrollable factors or noise factors. 
[37] Therefore, the resulting system works well across the noise factors that are 
included in the experimental design [38].  
3. Uncontrollable Factors 
In addition to factors that are related to UAVs and directly investigable, 
there are also uncontrollable factors in the experimental design. Uncontrollable 
factors, also known as noise factors, are factors that are hard to regulate. Yet, 
they may have significant effects on the response. Enemy capabilities are a 
typical example of the uncontrollable factors. The list of factors associated with 
Scouts, Red Teams, and Civilians, which are given in Table 2, constitutes the 
uncontrollable factors for this study. Red Agents have a perfect stealth value in 
Enemy Contact 3 state. So, all the factors in this part affect their ability to avoid 
detection. 
B. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBE (NOLH) DESIGNS 
The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design developed by 
Cioppa (2002) is used in this study [39]. A NOLH design is a special case of Latin 
Hypercube (LH) designs. The experimental region in a NOLH design is shaped 
by the minimum and maximum levels of each factor. It is impossible to run a 
model for all possible combinations of factor levels, even with today’s 
supercomputers. If there are many factors to vary in the design, we need 
advanced techniques to analyze the effects of these factors simultaneously. 
Therefore, a NOLH design is chosen to efficiently provide information from the 
experimental runs for the 21 factors in this study.  
The Excel spreadsheet, from the SEED Center for Data Farming at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, was developed by Professor Susan 
Sanchez and is used to build the NOLH design for this study [29]. The 
spreadsheet allows building different designs depending on the number of factors 
(minimum 7, maximum 29). We use the 17–22 factors design. The spreadsheet 
takes the high level, low level, and decimal points as inputs and returns an 
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equally spaced permutation of values in between defined levels for each factor. 
Figure 19 depicts the first 10 rows of the NOLH design for the 21 factors varied in 
this study.  
 
Figure 19. NOLH design spreadsheet for 17–22 factors design from Tom 
Cioppa’s 2002 Ph.D. dissertation. 
1. Space-filling Property of NOLH Design 
The NOLH design has good space-filling filling properties [40]. Space-
filling means the design points (DPs) are scattered uniformly across the possible 
range of input data. The scatter plot matrix is one of the primary graphical tools 
used to visualize relationships between variables. Scatter plot matrices for 
controllable and uncontrollable factors are shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21, 
respectively. (Scatterplot matrix for all factors is included in Appendix B.) The 
entries in the matrix are the pairwise comparisons of the factors in the 
experimental design. For example, the first scatter plot of Figure 20, in row 1, 
column 1, contains the input settings between UAV speed in enemy contact state 
and UAV speed in default state. The coverage of factor levels for both plots 
verifies the broad space-filling of our NOLH design.  
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Figure 20. Scatterplot matrix for controllable factors. 
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Figure 21. Scatterplot matrix for uncontrollable factors. 
2. Near Orthogonality of NOLH Design  
In addition to the space filling property, orthogonality is also desirable in a 
design because it renders uncorrelated estimates for the regression coefficients. 
The correlation diagram represented in Figure 22 confirms that the correlations 
between the factors in the experiment are insignificant. A value of 1, colored red, 
implies a very strong positive correlation, while a value of -1, colored blue, 
represents a very strong negative correlation. The diagonal of the diagram 
displays the correlation of a factor by itself. 
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Figure 22. Correlation diagram for all of the factors in the experiment. 
The histogram of correlations, among all factors, given in Figure 23 
displays that the mean correlation is 0.004. The results of the correlation diagram 
and the histogram verify that our design is nearly orthogonal. 
 
Figure 23. Histogram of correlation between all of the factors in the experiment. 
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C. MODEL RUNS 
1. Tools and Techniques 
Sanchez’s NOLH design spreadsheet provides 129 DPs for 21 factors 
varied in the design. After using the design sheet, we add another 13 dependent 
input variables to the design. The whole design is then crossed with the number 
of UAVs (1 up to 4) in Excel. The final design we create contains 516 DPs.  
The software package Xstudy, written by SEED Center Research 
Associate Steve Upton, is used to create the mapping between variables in the 
design and elements of the MANA scenario file, and to specify the number of 
independent replications per DP. Consequently, a design file in xml format is 
generated. The XStudy software package is available at http://harvest.nps.edu. A 
follow on to XStudy is software called OldMcData, which is also written by Steve 
Upton, it manages the generation of scenario files for each design point using the 
experimental design sheet, the baseline MANA xml files created for each 
scenario, and the XStudy xml files. The OldMcData software package is also 
available at http://harvest.nps.edu. 
The open source software package Condor, which is available from the 
University of Wisconsin at http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor/, distributes and 
manages the jobs across a set of available processors. In our study, the model is 
run on cluster, called “reaper,” with 44 processors. Finally, a postprocessor 
included in OldMcData is used to combine all of the simulation outputs, with their 
corresponding input values, into a single comma-separated (csv) file.  
2. Time Analysis  
The run time for a single replication of the base case is about 7 to 8 
minutes on average. The number of replications desired is calculated using the 
formula in equation 1. We use an α value of 0.05 and β value of 0.10. Therefore, 
we need to take about 200 samples in order to have a 90% chance of detecting a 
difference in means of 1 for a test with a 5% type-I error rate. As a result, 200 
replications are made for each design point. Figure 24 displays the change in 
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sample size required based on the empirical variance of mean number of Red 












=  −   (1) 
 
 
Figure 24. Number of replications required per design point. 
We end up with a total of 103,200 simulated terrorist incursions, which 
would have taken about 573 days to run using only a single processor. However, 
since the model is run on a cluster with 44 processors, it takes about only about 
13 days to complete all of the runs. The model runs took longer time than 
expected due to failures on a section of node during the runs. However, this 
analysis would require approximately 35×1011 replications with a traditional, 
brute-force full-factorial design. Graphical comparisons for the required number 
of runs and time needed to complete these runs are provided in Figure 25 and 




















Figure 25. Graphical comparison of the number of replications required for the 
study with full factorial design, fractional factorial design, and NOLH 
design. 
 
Figure 26. Graphical comparison of the years required to complete number of 




































Time required to complete number of 
replications 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we provide a quick review of the analysis tools utilized in 
this study. Then, we discuss the results of some initial runs that were made 
without using an experimental design. In the last section, we present a 
discussion of various statistical modeling techniques to analyze the relationships 
between the factors in the experimental design and our MOEs. 
A. ANALYSIS TOOLS 
1. JMP 
JMP, one of the two tools used to analyze the data, was created by SAS 
in 1986 as a data exploration tool. According to JMP’s official website, available 
at http://www.jmp.com, it provides graphical and visual interpretations of data 
[41].  Additionally, JMP has a dynamic user interface that allows users to conduct 
interactive data analysis. 
JMP enables a wide variety of statistical techniques, such as linear 
regression, nonlinear regression, partition trees, time series analysis, Gaussian 
process, neural networks, and more. We use JMP Statistical Discovery Software 
version 10.0.0 to perform the regression analysis for this study. 
2. R 
R is a language and environment for data manipulation, statistical 
computing, and graphical display. It was developed by John Chambers and his 
colleagues based on the code written for the S language and its environment 
[42].  R is free software available in source code format and capable of working 
on various platforms, such as Windows, UNIX, and MacOS. Users can extend 
R’s functionality by adding new functions or installing new packages. In addition 
to JMP, we use R as a supplementary tool for our analysis.   
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B. RESULTS OF INITIAL RUNS 
Following the creation of the model in MANA, 200 initial runs are made for 
the base case for each scenario. We expect to see how results change 
depending on the number of UAVs through these preliminary runs and get 
information on the variability associated with the numerous random elements in 
the model.  
1. Total Number of Red Agents Arrived at Destination 
There are 150 Red Agents that are trying to cross the border in the 
simulation model. They can either be detected and classified by Blue Agents, or 
they can reach their destination without being detected. Upon reaching its goal 
undetected, each Red Agent kills one Blue Target which is placed at the 
destination of Red Agents. Thus, the number of killed Blue Targets forms a 
surrogate for the number of Red Agents that reach the destination. Figure 27 
displays the distribution of the number of Red Agents that reach the destination 
for the scenarios analyzed. The histogram provides the distribution of arrived 
Red Agents within the predefined time frame. In addition to the histogram, box 
plots depict the summary statistics of the data pictorially. According to the 
summary statistics, on average, 60 of the Red Agents are able to reach their 
destination within the predefined maximum timeline. The mean number of arrived 
Red Agents decreases with the number of UAVs (0 up to 4). The mean number 




Figure 27. Distribution of total number of Red Agents that reach the destination.  
2. Total Number of Classified Red Agents  
The Red Agents in the simulation model can only be classified by the 
UAVs. The Red Agents are the most valuable targets. Therefore, they have the 
highest priority in the UAV sensor set up. Following their classification, Red 
Agents are devolved to the Blue Killing Agent to prevent multiple classifications. 
The distribution of the number of classified Red Agents is provided in Figure 28. 
The number of classified Red Agents is 0, as expected, when there are no UAVs 
over the region. The mean number of classified Red Agents increases with the 
number of UAVs. The mean of the total number of classified Red Agents jumps 
from 0 to 122.485 for scenario two with one UAV. The total number of classified 
Red Agents can reach 150 for scenario three and scenario four.   
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Figure 28. Distribution of total number of classified Red Agents. 
The average number of classified Red Agents is plausibly high even with 
two UAVs over the area of interest. Nevertheless, the variability decreases when 
we increase the number of UAVs. Figure 29 and Figure 30 provide the average 
and standard deviation of the number of arrived and classified Red Agents for the 
results of 200 initial runs in each scenario. As a result of the intuition gained 
through the initial runs, the design is crossed for the number of UAVs (1 up to 4). 
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Figure 29. Average number of arrived and classified Red Agents based on the 
results of 200 initial runs. 
   
Figure 30. Standard deviation of arrived and classified Red Agents based on the 
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C. RESULTS OF RUNS FOR CROSSED DESIGN 
We use the mean of 200 replications as our measure of effectiveness 
(MOEs). As a result, we reduce the number of data points from 103,200 to 516. 
This facilitates visual displays of the data. 
1. Measure of Effectiveness 
The purpose of the study is to analyze the effectiveness of UAVs on 
detection of terrorists over a hard topographical region. Therefore, we describe 
two MOEs to measure the effect of model factors on UAV performance. The 
mean numbers of arrived and classified Red Agents are the two MOEs 
investigated for the purpose of this analysis. An initial assessment of the MOEs 
highlighted that there is a strong negative correlation between the numbers of 
arrived and classified Red Agents. Figure 31 shows the correlation between 
these two MOEs. The correlation between the MOEs is -0.6898. 
 59 
 
Figure 31. Scatterplot of the mean numbers of arrived and classified Red Agents.  
Since the two MOEs are so highly correlated, we choose the number of 
classified Red Agents as the primary MOE to study the effect of factors on the 
UAV’s performance. The color map of correlations, ranging from -1 to 1 and 
provided in Figure 32, shows that the two MOEs have a strong negative 
relationship. Consequently, we expect independent regressors to have reverse 
impacts on these two MOEs.  
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Figure 32. Color map of correlations among MOEs. 
2. T-test for Comparison of the Sample Mean  
The scenarios developed for the different number of UAVs are compared 
with each other, in terms of mean number of classified Red Agents, to explore 
how different number of UAVs contributes to detection and classification of Red 
Agents. 
The results of the T-Test for the mean number of classified Red Agents 
yield that there is a statistically significant difference between the scenarios at a 
95% confidence level (or when α = .005). As expected, the mean number of 
classified Red Agents increases with the number of UAVs as shown in Figure 33. 
A detailed comparison report of each pair is provided in Appendix C.  
In addition to the T-test, we look at the trend between number of UAVs 
and corresponding coefficient estimates, and verify the linear relationship. Then, 
we fit two distinct models changing the classification of number of UAVs as 
continuous and as discrete. The F-test critical value, calculated based on these 
two models is 0.47, which is much less than the F-statistic critical value of 2.19 
[43]. Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that it is okay to 
treat the number of UAVs as a continuous variable. As a result, we conduct the 
rest of the analysis using the number of UAVs as a continuous variable. 
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Figure 33. T-test for comparison of mean number of classified Red Agents. 
3. Linear Regression 
We use linear regression to explore the relationship between the response 
variable and the input factors. The linear model presumes that the regression 
function is linear or that the linear model is an acceptable approximation [44]. 
The basic mathematical interpretation of the linear model is stated by the 















In the equation, jX  represents the independent regressors. The factors 
presented in Table 2 are the independent regressors of our study.  0β  represents 
the intercept and β j  stands for the coefficients of the independent regressors. In 
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our study, we want to fit the number of classified Red Agents using the 
regression function on the factors. 
a. The Basic Model 
The mean number of classified Red Agents is used as the 
response variable to conduct a stepwise linear regression [44] with all of the 
independent factors in the experimental design. The resulting model has an R2 
value, the coefficient of determination, of 0.7948 and an adjusted R2 value of 
0.7903, which means that the regressors in the model explain approximately 
80% of the variability in the response. We then perform model diagnostics using 
the residual plots shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34. Residuals plots for the stepwise regression model. 
All Cook’s distance values are less than one, which shows that 
there are no influential points. However, the residual versus fitted plot indicates 
non constant variance in the model. Non constant variance, or 
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heteroscedasticity, is anticipated in the simulation model due to the hard 
topography of the region. Additionally, the normal quantile plot points out that the 
errors are not normally distributed. After the diagnosis of the initial model, a Box-
Cox transformation is performed on the response variable. We observe a lambda 
value of 0.4 through the plot provided in Figure 35 and conduct a power 
transformation on response. 
 
Figure 35. Graphical result of Box-Cox transformation suggests a power 
transformation of 0.4 on the response. 
 We fit a new model using the response variable with the power 
transformation. The heteroscedasticity and normality problems seem to be 
handled by this according to the plots given in Figure 36. Moreover, the R2 value 
increases from 0.7923 to 0.8837. Finally, we conduct a Durbin Watson test to 
ensure that the autocorrelation between the regressors is zero. The test returns a 
Durbin Watson statistic of 2.0683 with a p-value of 0.7663, which is greater than 
our significance level of 0.05 (α = 0.05). Therefore, there is no strong evidence 
that violates the null hypothesis and we conclude that the autocorrelation is zero. 
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Figure 36. Residuals plot after the Box-Cox transformation on the response. 
The p-value of the basic model is less than 0.0001, which indicates 
there is a highly significant relationship between the response and regressors 





Figure 37. The statistical results for the basic model after the Box-Cox 
transformation. 
There are 11 factors that have the highest impact on the response 
when α = 0.05. Table 3 provides the list of these factors in the order of their 
significance level. The t-ratio changes with the contribution of the factor to the 
explanatory power of model. Therefore, the factors with the highest t-ratio are the 
most significant in the model. UAV classification range in the default state and 
probability of classification in the enemy contact state, Red Team sensor range, 
number of UAVs, time between detections, and UAV fuel level are the major 
factors that affect the classified number of Red Agents within the predefined time 





Table 3.   Sorted parameter estimates for the basic model 
 
b. The Saturated Model 
Following the basic model, we fit models that include interactions 
and higher order terms. First, we fit a model with all pairwise interactions among 
the significant factors and compare this model with the basic model, without 
interaction effects, using an F test. The F test returns a p-value of 2.2e-16. As a 
result, we strongly reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the saturated 
model provides an improvement over the basic model. The model with all two 
way interactions has an R2 value of 0.9334 with 30 terms included in the model. 
The statistical results and sorted parameter estimates for the model with 
interaction effects are shown in Appendix D.  
Likewise, we fit a model including quadratic effects of significant 
factors in the model using stepwise linear regression. The results indicate that 
quadratic term for time between detections, UAV classification range, number of 
UAVs, Red Team sensor range, and UAV fuel level are significant. An improved 
R2 value of 0.9684 is provided by the model with these significant interactions 
and quadratic terms. Figure 38 provides the statistical summary of the resulting 





Figure 38. Statistical results for the model with interactions and quadratic terms. 
Finally, we observe the change in the R2 value of the model by 
adding parameters to the model in their order of their significance. The purpose 
is to reduce the complexity without significantly demoting the predictive capability 
of the model. That is, we desire a parsimonious model. According to the plot in 
Figure 39, the R2 value almost evens out after the seventeenth parameter. This 
indicates that only 17 of the 28 parameters in the model with main effects, 
interactions, and quadratic effects contribute the vast majority of the predictive 
power of the model.  
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Figure 39. R2 value plot for the number of parameters included in the model in 
the order of their significance. 
The reduced size model, which has an R2 value of 0.957048, 
includes the factors listed in Table 4. We see that UAV classification range in 
default state and probability of classification in enemy contact state, Red sensor 
range, number of UAVs, time between detections in the default state, and 
quadratic effects of classification range have the highest impact on the model. 
Table 4.   Sorted parameter estimates for the reduced-size model highlighted 
by the R2 method given in Figure 39.  
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4. Lasso Regression 
The least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (lasso) is a method 
for estimation in linear models. It drops some coefficients off and sets the others 
to 0, thus attempting to return a less complex model [45]. The lasso method uses 
a diamond shaped constraint region and performs L1 shrinkage. The sum of 
squares is calculated based on various coefficients that are drawn as red contour 
lines in Figure 40. If the sum of squares hits one of the corners of blue diamond, 
then corresponding coefficients are set to 0 [46]. The amount of shrinkage in the 
model is driven by a tuning parameter lambda. 
 
Figure 40. Estimation picture for the lasso regression where ellipses are the 
contours of the least squares error function and blue area is the 
constraint region. (From: onlinecourses.science.psu.edu). 
We apply this method to the saturated model with 28 terms. Figure 41 
displays the cross-validated Mean Square Error (MSE) plot. The dashed line in 
the plot represents the lambda value with minimal MSE plus one standard 
deviation. As lambda increases, MSE also increases rapidly. This means that the 
coefficients are reduced too much and the resulting model has a poor 
explanatory power. As lambda decreases, a smaller number of coefficients are 
set to 0.  
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Figure 41. The cross-validated Mean Square Error.  
Then, we choose the least complex model using the “one-standard-error” 
rule. The trace plot of coefficients is provided in Figure 42. The plot shows the 
nonzero coefficients in the model for different values of lambda. The dashed line 
in the plot represents the lambda value corresponding to minimal MSE and 
number of terms included in the model within one standard error. The lasso 
asserts 17 terms based on the minimum least squares error approach. The 
factors chosen by lasso regression are almost same with the factors in Table 4 
except for the quadratic terms. Different than quadratic effects, lasso regression 
keeps civilian communication range and it’s interactions with the factors time 
between detections and civilian communication exists.   
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Figure 42. Trace plot of coefficients fit by lasso. 
5. Regression Tree Analysis 
Regression trees, also known as partition trees, provide another method 
to analyze regression problems. A regression tree represents the decision 
making steps visually and iteratively. The tree model is attained by recursively 
partitioning the data space and fitting a simple model based on each partition. 
Then, the results can be displayed as a regression tree [47]. The determination 
of the optimal split point is made based on the minimum sum of squares [44]. 
After each split, the succeeding ideal split is determined within each partition. 
We build a regression tree for the mean number classified Red Agents 
given all input factors. When we look at the first 4 splits presented in Figure 43, 
we see that the results conform to the results of stepwise regression and lasso 
regression in previous sections. Each box in the tree structure provides the factor 
and level of optimal split. In addition to factor and level, the number of data points 
included in the split, mean number of classified Red Agents, and standard 
deviation within the split are also provided in the box. We see that the first split is 
on UAV default state classification range of 5000 meters. 200 observations have 
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classification range less than 5000 meters with a mean response value of 11.23, 
whereas 316 observations have classification range greater than 5000 meters 
with a mean response value of 38.56. The next split occurs for Red Agent sensor 
range of 1400 meters. The mean number of classified Red Agents is 52.79 when 
the Red sensor range is less than 1400 meters. 
 
Figure 43. Partition tree model for the number of classified Red Agents. 
Following the initial splits, we grow a regression tree with 20 splits and 
observe an R2 value of 0.826 (The tree structure for first 13 splits is provided in 




Figure 44. Split history of tree model. 
  
The variable contributions to the explanatory power of the tree model are 
provided in Figure 45. The tree model indicates that we can explain variability in 
the response with a less complex model including just seven factors. Following 
the tree model, we fit a linear regression model with these highlighted seven 
factors and observe an R2 value of 0.87. The results of the tree model yield that 
UAV classification performance is mainly driven by the classification range in the 
default state, but changes depending on the Red Team sensor range, UAV  
classification probability, number of UAVs, time between detections in default 
state, UAV speed, and UAV fuel level. 
 
Figure 45. Variable contributions to the explanatory power of the tree model. 
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6. Random Forest Analysis 
Random forests, first introduced by Leo Breiman, are “black-box” 
supervised learning methods for classification and regression. Thus, their 
interpretation capability is not as powerful as their prediction power. Random 
forests grow many classification trees, and these trees vote the most popular 
class for a given input set [48].  The number of trees and number of variables to 
try in each split can be determined by users. If we assume that a number of m 
variables can be used in each split, the algorithm randomly selects m variables 
out of all available candidates. Then, the best split is chosen over the m 
variables. Random forests grow the largest possible tree without pruning. We 
grow 500 trees and subset 4 variables to try in each split. The random forests 
model explains 94.36% of the variability in the response with a MSE of 0.1331.  
Random forests can also be used to determine variable importance in a 
regression problem. The variable importance, based on a decrease in 
classification accuracy, pinpointed by the random forests model, can be seen in 
Figure 46. Similar to results of regression and tree analysis; random forests also 
highlight seven factors. We again see that UAV classification range in default 
state and Red Team sensor range have the highest impact on UAV performance 






Figure 46. Sorted variable importance pinpointed by the random forests model. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the effectiveness of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in helping secure a border characterized by 
rough terrain and active terrorists. Additionally, we investigated how the number 
of UAVs and performance characteristics contribute to border security.  
We have identified some important factors related with UAVs and 
infiltration operations based on our scenarios. It would be almost impossible to 
model every aspect of an infiltration scenario. Yet, this was not the purpose of 
our study. We focus our study on gross level effects of factors of interest to look 
at if it is possible to use UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
purposes over a hard topographical region.  
We utilize four analysis techniques to study the mean number of classified 
Red Agents (terrorists): stepwise linear regression, lasso regression, regression 
trees, and random forests on the results of 103,200 simulated infiltration 
scenarios. The four analysis techniques highlight similar factors as the most 
important factors with additional insights.  
A. PRIMARY FINDINGS 
• Agent-based models provide us a modeling platform to create and analyze 
scenarios in a short time period. 
• The data farming process is a powerful technique to study the effects of 
numerous factors simultaneously.   
• The use of UAVs significantly enhances the detection and classification of 
terrorists operating or transiting in the region. 
• The classification range of a UAV has a strong positive affect in the 
number of classified terrorists. First split of regression tree analysis 
highlights the importance of having a classification range greater than 5 
km.  
• The sensor range of terrorists to detect UAVs has a negative impact on 
the number of classified terrorists. Even though UAV altitude is not 
highlighted as a significant factor, assigning UAVs at higher altitudes can 
reduce their probability of detection by terrorists. 
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• The classification probability of a UAV is also important. A 1% increase in 
classification probability results in more classified terrorists. Additionally, 
regression tree analysis yields that a maximum range (≥ 5000 meters) 
classification probability greater than 0.17 provides better results in the 
classification of terrorists. From a practical sense, classification probability 
of a camera, which is onboard the UAV, leads to the number of effective 
looks needed to search an area. So, this is an important factor to take into 
account in terms of mission plan and organization. 
• We cannot talk about an optimal number of UAVs to assign over the area 
of interest, but regression tree analysis indicates that assigning three or 
more UAVs results in more classified terrorists with a lower variance. 
• The time between detections of entities is another important factor in 
terms of a UAV’s classification capability. A one second increment of time 
between detections in the default state causes a larger decrease in the 
number of classified terrorists than a one second increment of time 
between detections in enemy contact state.  
• Refueling time is a bigger determinant of success than the initial fuel level 
of a UAV. Thus, it is important for ground bases to be able to quickly get 
the UAVs back up. 
• Increasing the UAV’s speed in the default state has a negative impact on 
UAV classification performance. Regression tree analysis shows that UAV 
speeds higher than 250 km/hr noticeably decreases the number of 
classified terrorists. Therefore, the speed of flight is critical. If it is too high, 
UAVs will quickly occupy images of the terrain and will miss the details. 
On the contrary, if the speed is too low, then there will be less variation in 
the occupied image, hence less information will be gathered through the 
scans.  
• The existence of communication links between the civilians and terrorists 
is another significant factor on UAV performance. The existence of civilian 
communication with terrorist caused a reduction in the number of 
classified terrorists. Therefore, SIGINT and electronic warfare capabilities 
can be considered in addition to UAV performance characteristics. 
B. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
• The stepwise linear regression indicates a significant interaction between 
classification range and classification probability. Increasing classification 
probability has a greater effect on the number of classified terrorists when 
the classification range is high.  
• Another significant interaction highlighted by the stepwise linear 
regression is between terrorists’ sensor range and civilian communication 
range with terrorists. For example, when the terrorist sensor range is low, 
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more advanced civilian communication abilities can still have a negative 
effect on the performance of a UAV.   
• A third significant interaction emphasized by the stepwise linear 
regression is between the number of UAVs and UAV classification range. 
When the number of UAVs decreases, the number of classified terrorists 
is greater for increasing classification range. That is, higher performing 
UAVs can substitute for lower numbers. 
• The lasso regression points out the interaction between the existence of 
civilian communication link and the range of this link. When the civilian 
communication link exists, the number of classified terrorists goes down 
with increasing range of the communication link.  
• Finally, the lasso regression indicates the interaction between the civilian 
communication range with terrorists and time between detections of 
entities by UAVs. The civilian communication range has great effect on 
decreasing the number of classified terrorists when the time between 
detections is long. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis provides many topics for follow-up studies. The following is a 
list of topics that could be examined: 
• Use different paths for UAVs to follow over the area of interest. 
• Use different refueling strategies, such as refueling on the ground or 
refueling in the air, to study the effects of refueling time on UAV 
classification performance in more detail. We did not assume a specific 
refueling strategy in our scenarios. 
• Conduct a more focused scenario analysis including only the significant 
factors highlighted by this study. 
• Examine the effects of different terrorist personalities. We assumed that 
terrorists have a perfect stealth value in enemy contact state and their 
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APPENDIX A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES THAT FORM THE 
DESIGN POINTS WITH FACTORS VARIED IN THE DESIGN 
In addition to the factors varied in the design, there are also 13 dependent 
input variables that are set as a function of some factors: Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) classification range, UAV classification probability, time between 




Factor Name Unit 
Type of 
Variable 
Probability of Classification at  
Med. Range in Default State    continuous 
Probability of Classification at  
Min. Range in Default State    continuous 
Probability of Classification at  
Med. Range in Enemy Contact  State    continuous 
Probability of Classification at  
Min. Range in Enemy Contact  State    continuous 
Classification Range in Default  
State (Med.) m continuous 
Classification Range in Default  
State (Min.) m continuous 
Classification Range in Enemy  
Contact State (Med.) m continuous 
Classification Range in Enemy  
Contact State (Min.) m continuous 
Time Between Detection at Default 
 State (Med.) seconds continuous 
Time Between Detection at Default 
 State (Min.) seconds continuous 
Time Between Detection at Enemy  
Contact State (Med.) seconds continuous 
Time Between Detection at Enemy  
Contact State (Min.) seconds continuous 
Fuel Usage Rate in Refueling State unit continuous 
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APPENDIX B. SCATTERPLOT MATRIX FOR ALL FACTORS 
The scatterplot matrix for all factors, including controllable and 
uncontrollable factor shows the space filling property of our Nearly Orthogonal 
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APPENDIX C. DETAILED COMPARISONS REPORT FOR T-TEST 
The following provides the paired t-test comparisons for the number of 
classified Red Agents with different number of UAVs, with each assigned its own 














APPENDIX D. STATISTICAL RESULTS OF THE MODEL WITH 
INTERACTIONS 
We fit a saturated model first including all pairwise interactions among the 
significant factors. Here are the statistical results and sorted parameter estimates 
for the model exploring all two-way interactions: 
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APPENDIX E. TREE STRUCTURE FOR FIRST 13 SPLITS 
Regression trees recursively partition data to find an optimal split on the 
response. After each split, the succeeding ideal split is determined within each 
partition. We grow a regression tree with 20 splits. The tree structure for first 13 
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